Shariah Governance Quota Systems in Transition Economies: Designing a Dual-School Framework for Islamic Finance in Uzbekistan

This study examines the structural integration of a quota-based Shariah governance system within the conventional financial architecture of Uzbekistan. Emerging transition economies frequently experience systemic friction when introducing non-interest financial instruments into legal environments dominated by a single jurisprudential tradition. This paper evaluates a centralized regulatory model that balances domestic Hanafi traditions with Shafi‘i legal expertise to resolve this institutional mismatch. Comparative institutional analysis indicates that a mandatory composition quota within the central bank reduces regulatory fragmentation and eliminates conflicting cross-sectoral rulings. The qualitative evaluation demonstrates that structured multi-school deliberation converts comparative jurisprudence into an active tool for contract innovation and consumer risk mitigation. Operating a centralized authority establishes the systemic predictability necessary to mobilize informal liquidity and protect international market participants. This structural design offers a repeatable policy blueprint for state-led financial oversight bodies operating within post-Soviet economic environments.