Publication Details
Abstract
Municipal engineering projects are of critical significance for advancing China's high-quality sustainable development, fostering harmonious coexistence between human society and the natural environment, and enabling the construction of smart cities. This study constructs an ecological restoration network involving three stakeholders—the government, enterprises, and the local labor force at restoration sites—and employs a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework to examine how the interplay between government procurement payments and subsidy policies affects tripartite collaborative governance. The findings reveal that: (1) Compared with the "procurement-first, subsidy-later" strategy, the "subsidy-first, procurement-later" approach entails higher upfront government expenditure but achieves greater fiscal efficiency and generates superior corporate profits; (2) Subsidizing enterprises facilitates long-term talent accumulation and more effectively addresses employment needs within the restoration-site labor force, whereas compensating the labor force directly yields higher short-term corporate profitability; (3) The effectiveness of government procurement payment ratios and subsidy schemes depends critically on the actual number of participating workers and the residual value of their labor. Moreover, an optimal procurement payment ratio and subsidy range exist, under which each unit of subsidy maximizes capital utilization efficiency and simultaneously optimizes corporate profit outcomes.