An Assessment of the Political Economy of Protracted Conflict in North-East Nigeria

This paper assesses the political economy underpinning protracted conflict in North-East Nigeria with a focus on how the distribution of power, resources, and economic opportunities sustains violence across multiple areas in the country. Boko Haram insurgency is often treated as discrete security problem. This study argues that conflicts are manifestations of a common political economy of exclusion, extraction, and elite competition. The paper used the political economy and conflict transformation theories to guide the study. The study used the primary and secondary data to generate the needed data. Findings indicate that insurgency North East Nigeria began with genuine socio-economic grievances, including educational neglect, economic marginalization, and high youth unemployment rates over 50% in states like Borno and Yobe. However, the conflict has shifted from grievance-driven to greed-driven recovery plans that have prioritized negative peace and cash transfers over transforming the economic relationships and institutions that make violence profitable. The key actors have refused to allow the conflict to escalate to a level that threatens the state because they don’t want a declaration of a total war by the government and the international community which will eventually end the conflict and the benefits they derive from it. On the other hand, the conflict entrepreneurs and key actors have also refused the conflict to de-escalate into a lasting peace because they don’t want to lose the lucrative business as conflict entrepreneurs. The equilibrium they are maintaining is to prolong the economic gains of the conflict. The paper further reveals that the insurgents, bandits, government officials, military personnel, traditional rulers, business men and women among others are using the conflict to make money through the payment of ransom by victims and the government. The paper concludes that protracted conflict in Nigeria is not merely a security failure but a political economy outcome. The paper recommends that without transforming the underlying political economy, peacebuilding will remain a mirage and conflict will remain protracted.