Publication Details
Abstract
This article undertakes a comparative analysis of securities enforcement frameworks in the United States and selected former Soviet republics, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Drawing on statutory texts, regulatory practice, enforcement records, and academic scholarship, the article examines how divergent historical, institutional, and political trajectories have shaped the capacity and willingness of regulatory bodies to enforce securities law. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is examined as a mature benchmark model, characterized by independent regulatory authority, robust civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms, active whistleblower programs, and strong investor protection norms. Against this baseline, the article traces the post-1991 transition experiences of former Soviet republics, documenting initial legislative transplantation efforts, the persistence of state-centric governance cultures, weak judicial independence, and endemic corporate opacity as enduring obstacles to effective enforcement. The article identifies areas of normative convergence—particularly in the formal adoption of disclosure requirements and market conduct rules—while highlighting the significant implementation gap that separates written law from operational reality in transition economies. The findings suggest that sustainable securities enforcement reform in post-Soviet contexts requires not merely legislative approximation to Western models but deeper institutional capacity building, judicial reform, and anti-corruption efforts. The article contributes to the comparative securities law literature by offering a structured analytical framework applicable to emerging market regulatory reform.