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# Türkiye's Political Position on the Events in Palestine 2002-2011

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**Abstract:**

Since the beginning of the first decade of the new millennium, Turkey has sought to adopt a foreign policy characterized by independence and effectiveness in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly the Palestinian issue. Between 2006 and 2011, Ankara adopted strategic positions that supported Palestinian rights and demonstrated a firm commitment to their cause. that on several axes, most notably relief and humanitarian support for the Gaza Strip, and strengthening cooperation with Palestinian factions, In addition to Its support for the Palestinian reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Turkey also played a prominent diplomatic role by voting in favor of granting Palestine non- member state status at the United Nations in 2011, strengthening its position as a major supporter of the Palestinian cause on the international stage.

Turkey's stance has evolved to be characterized by its ability to balance its strategic relations with the United States and Israel on the one hand, and its continued support for Palestine on the other. Despite the tensions that arose after the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, and Turkey's rejection of Israeli policies in Gaza, Ankara has continued to strengthen its regional and international position as a primary supporter of Palestinian rights, expressing its rejection of any foreign interference in its national affairs and its policy of support for Palestine.

**Keywords:** Türkiye, Palestine, Palestinian issue, Türkiye's position.

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## Introduction

The study concerns the monitoring of formal transformations within the framework and style during the period in which the artist Francisco Goya began practicing art and participating in art exhibitions, from the year 1775 until the year 1828. The artist's work was represented in Spain and France, and included paintings in oil and pastel colors and works printed with acid and wood-engraving. The study analyses the artist's unique artistic growth process, expressed in his work. The enactment, detection and reflection of a psychological nature are influenced by the data of the habitus, the environment and socialization, which in turn form a pattern of concepts that the self establishes its authorial references through which it expresses them in an independent creative manner (Gambini & Pullin, 2024). This is achieved through a selective strategy between subject, material and expression. The nature of the intellectual environment resulting from cultural, political, religious and social pressures or psychological and

**The introduction**

Turkey's policy toward the Palestinian issue has been one of the most prominent aspects of Turkish relations with the Arab and Islamic worlds over the past two decades. Turkey took several historic positions between 2006 and 2011 that demonstrated its deep commitment to the Palestinian cause on both the humanitarian and diplomatic levels. This has evolved that the approach is part of a foreign policy aimed at strengthening Türkiye's role as an influential regional power, seeking to achieve independence in its decision-making, away from international pressure exerted by some Western powers. Especially US American and Israel. Turkish policy was also distinguished in That period by providing relief and technical support to the Gaza Strip, which constituted a major tool of Türkiye's soft policy.

TI helped Türkiye has been involved in the Palestinian events since the beginning of the first decade of the new millennium. So it adopted positions supporting Palestinian rights, emphasizing the need to unify Palestinian ranks. Turkey responded to developments in the region and focused its efforts on strengthening its international standing by voting in favor of the Palestinian cause at the United Nations in 2011. The ruling Justice and Development Party also supported internal Palestinian negotiations, making Türkiye a crucial player in promoting Palestinian national reconciliation.

The research is divided into an introduction, a preface, three chapters, and conclusions. Review the preface ((**The historical background of Türkiye's positions on the Palestinian issue before 2002))**As for the first topic ((**The Justice and Development Party's position on the Palestinian issue (2002-2011))**In the second section, we discussed ((**The Regional and International Dimension of Turkish Policy Towards Palestine (2002-2011)))**While the third topic included ((**Turkish Initiatives to Support the Palestinian Cause (2002-2011))**As for the conclusions, I reviewed the most important conclusions I reached.

The researcher relied on many sources in Turkish and English, which provided important information for this research.

**TMahid**

**The historical background of Türkiye's positions on the Palestinian issue before 2002.**

Türkiye's stance on the Palestinian issue emerged in the late Ottoman era, when Palestine acquired a symbolic and spiritual dimension within the Ottoman Empire's provinces, given its location as home to Islamic holy sites, most notably Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site in Islam. Protecting Palestine was considered that the holy sites are part of the religious and political legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire [(i)]. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the establishment of the Turkish stateIn 1924, direct political ties were severed, but the religious and emotional connection to the Palestinian cause remained firmly rooted in the conscience of the Turkish nation, particularly among Islamic and nationalist movements that viewed support for Palestine as an extension of the civilizational and historical duty inherited from the Ottoman Caliphate. That the feeling in the Turkish conscience with the rise of the Zionist project and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, which revived fears of the loss of the Islamic identity of Palestine, and opened the way for voices demanding the restoration of the Turkish role in defending Jerusalem, not only as a religious duty, but also as a historical and moral entitlement stemming from the Ottoman legacy [(ii)].

The decades following the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate were marked by the establishment of the Turkish Republic on strictly secular foundations, which led to a weakening of official political engagement with the Palestinian issue, in line with the Kemalist approach that sought to reduce the role of religion in foreign policy [(iii)]. Despite

this, popular sympathy for the Palestinians remained, manifested in demonstrations and solidarity activities that expressed popular rejection of the Israeli occupation [iv]. During the 1950s and 1960s, Ankara maintained a lukewarm diplomatic relationship with Israel, without actively participating in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead, it leaned toward the Western bloc within the framework of the Cold War, in accordance with its commitments within NATO [v]. which she joined in 1952[vi] Türkiye has justified on It was guided by security and economic considerations in light of its internal and external challenges, at a time when it was seeking to prove its allegiance to the Western camp against the then-rising Soviet influence [vii].

A new phase in Turkish-Israeli relations began during the 1990s, when Ankara signed several military, security, and intelligence agreements with Tel Aviv [viii]. culminated in the 1996 Military Cooperation Agreement, which included joint military exercises and the exchange of technological and security expertise [ix]. It has raised that the rapprochement sparked widespread discontent in Turkey and the Arab world, and was seen as a strategic shift in Turkey's foreign policy, particularly as it came at a time when most Arab countries were boycotting Israel diplomatically. This coincided with the rising influence of Islamist movements within Türkiye, which viewed the that the partnership represents a betrayal of the Ottoman Islamic legacy and contradicts the moral and historical position supporting the Palestinians. Nationalist and leftist forces also expressed concern that it could turn in to that the alliance leads to strategic dependence on Israel, at the expense of Turkey's political independence in Middle East affairs [x].

However, Turkish policy was not unified in that the matter, as the opposition forces and Islamic movements expressed their rejection of that the rapprochement, considering it a deviation from national and religious principles and a violation of the principles of solidarity with the Palestinian people, has been raised in parliament, the media, and civil society platforms, holding the government responsible for acquiescing to a project that harms Türkiye's standing in the world. Islamic [xi]on the other hand, successive governments justified these relations based on security and economic considerations, especially in light of the regional isolation that Turkey was suffering from at the time, and within the framework of the quest to possess regional pressure tools and advanced technological sources, in addition to attempts to consolidate Türkiye's position as a Collaborating Practitioner In the regional security system linked to the West [xii].

It became clear to us MN Turkey's stance on the Palestinian issue has fluctuated, linked to the trends of its domestic and foreign policy. Following the founding of the republic, Turkey pursued a secular, isolationist policy, distancing itself from Middle Eastern issues, including Palestine. However, Turkish popular ties to Palestine persisted despite ongoing Israeli massacres and attacks.

**The First Topic**

**The Justice and Development Party's position on the Palestinian issue (2002-2011).**

**A-The Turkish political discourse changed after the party came to power.**

The Turkish political discourse on the Palestinian issue crystallized clearly after the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada. In 2000 [xiii]As Turkish popular criticism of Israeli practices escalated, political circles affiliated with the Islamist movement began to direct sharp criticism at what was considered Western bias towards Israel [xiv]. As a result of those events the Justice and Development Party was founded. In August 2001 [xv] Carrying a new foreign policy orientation, based on an Islamic reference that views Palestine as a central issue in the conscience of the Islamic nation. And when N After the party took power after winning the November 2002 elections, it adopted a more outspoken political discourse and sympathy for Palestinian rights, abandoning the diplomatic caution that had characterized the positions of previous Turkish governments

[xvi]. And it harmonized that the shift coincided with the growing Turkish popular mood, which rejected Western bias toward Israel and demanded a more effective Turkish policy in supporting Islamic causes [xvii].

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced [xviii]On December 28, 2008, he categorically rejected the Israeli attacks [xix]. on the Gaza Strip, describing it as a crime against humanity [xx]. Then, on 29 January 2009, during his participation in the Davos Forum, he condemned [xxi]economic, the ongoing Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, calling on the international community to hold Israel accountable for its ongoing violations against the Palestinian people. Erdogan denounced the silence of the major powers regarding these attacks, considering that Silence is a blatant moral complicity. As the aggression escalated, the Turkish rhetoric became more strident. So Erdogan continued to sharply criticize Israel, accusing it of violating international law and humanitarian conventions. With the escalation of the Israeli attack on Gaza general 2009, that to withdraw Erdogan on the Davos Economic Forum session on 29 January 2009, he said: "I will never return to Davos again. "And that in protest against the statements of Israeli President Shimon Perry Z (1923-2016)[xxii], which made his positions more clear and stronger towards the Palestinian issue. And through that Position: Erdogan stressed that Türkiye will not remain silent regarding the suffering of the Palestinians, and that it will continue to pressure the international community to stop Israeli violations [xxiii].

T this shift in Turkish policy was most clearly embodied in 2010, after the Mavi Marmara incident, when Israeli forces intercepted the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara on May 31, 2010, which was on its way to Gaza carrying humanitarian aid as part of the Freedom Flotilla [xxiv]. The attack killed nine Turkish citizens (a tenth later died of his wounds), prompting the Turkish government to take strict diplomatic measures against Israel, including the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador from Ankara in September 2011. The Turkish leadership also insisted that Israel be held accountable for the attack, which led to a significant deterioration in relations between the two countries [xxv].

Led that the shift in Turkish policy is reshaping Türkiye's position in the international arena. So it has become considered a supportive force for the Palestinian cause. While Türkiye has faced Western criticism, it has been accused of a Politicizing the Palestinian issue for ideological purposes, the Turkish government has stuck to its position, considering its support for Palestine a moral and historical obligation that transcends narrow political considerations [xxvi].

**For_Turkey's position on the Palestinian elections general 2006 and its regional repercussions.**

Hamas's victory in the Palestinian legislative elections held on 25 January 2006, sparked mixed regional and international reactions. Turkey's position emerged as the most open among NATO countries. Ankara treated the election results as a fair democratic event in which the Palestinian people freely expressed their will, while Western powers, primarily the United States, chose to American the European Union's policy of isolation and imposing sanctions on the new Palestinian government led by Hamas [xxvii].

As a result of these events, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul received [xxviii] On 16 February 2006, a delegation from Hamas headed by Khaled Meshaal [xxix] in the capital, Ankara. That he meeting came three weeks after the movement's victory in the Palestinian legislative elections held on 25 January of the same year, marking a precedent in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey was the first non- Arab country to officially receive a delegation from the movement, thereby circumventing the diplomatic embargo imposed on Hamas by the United States and the European Union [xxx].

The meeting, which was held on 16 February 2006, sparked angry reactions from Israel and the United States, which considered that the move deviates from the international

consensus to isolate Hamas until it meets the Quartet's conditions. However, Türkiye has emphasized that The meeting was held at the request of Hamas, and came within the framework of Ankara's efforts to play the role of mediator in the Middle East peace process, while adhering to open dialogue with all concerned parties [xxxi].

In a statement made on 17 February 2006, Abdullah Gul affirmed his defense of the meeting with the Hamas delegation, stating that the movement came to power through the ballot box in democratic elections held on 25 January 2006. He said: "Since Hamas won democratic elections, it must from now on behave in a democratic manner" [xxxii]. He also explained that the Turkish government had conveyed to the Hamas delegation the expectations of the international community, which included the necessity of renouncing violence, respecting previous international agreements, and recognizing Israel's right to exist [xxxiii].

I refused a the committee designated Hamas as a terrorist organization, and emphasized that the designation of any Palestinian party should be based on its political behavior, not its ideological background. This paved the way for that the position of Türkiye's emergence as a non-Western channel of communication in the Palestinian mediation file, especially after the escalation of the internal division between Fatah and Hamas in June2007[xxxiv].

The Turkish government supported national reconciliation efforts and participated in the mediation efforts led by Cairo in 2008, in coordination with regional parties such as Qatar and Syria. Turkey emphasized that Palestinian unity is a political and security necessity to confront Israeli pressure and restore national rights. It also called on the international community to stop imposing preconditions on the internal Palestinian dialogue [xxxv].

Emerged that Turkish political engagement on more than one occasion, Especially During the visit of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu [xxxvi] 2 Damascus in October 2009, so Coordination took place with the Syrian leadership regarding the promotion of comprehensive reconciliation between the Palestinian factions, and it was announced at the time that Türkiye was ready to host any joint Palestinian meetings on its territory [xxxvii].

It is clear to us that Turkish foreign policy I witnessed Significant developments since 2002, so the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has adopted a new strategy to strengthen Ankara's regional standing, based on a discourse that combines democratic legitimacy with Islamic identity. Türkiye has also employed that this stage highlighted the West's contradictions in its support for democracy, along with its repositioning as a neutral mediator in the Palestinian issue, far removed from Western alignments. This contributed to the adoption of more effective and engaged policies on the Palestinian issue in subsequent years.

**C. Türkiye's position towards Israeli aggression on Gaza for the duration (2008-2009).**

The Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip in December 2008 sparked a wave of popular and official anger in Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed a clear and explicit condemnation of the attack, describing it as a "crime against humanity" and accusing Israel of committing massacres against civilians. Ankara went beyond verbal condemnation; it also exerted diplomatic pressure in international forums, demanding an immediate end to the aggression and the lifting of the blockade on Gaza [xxxviii].

The anger reached its peak in January 2009 During the World Economic Forum in Davos, so Erdogan walked out of a discussion session with Israeli President Shimon Peres, rejecting attempts to justify the massacres against Palestinians. There fore Erdogan made his famous statement: "You know very well how to kill children," which quickly became a symbol of popular Arab and Islamic anger, contributing to his strengthening position in the Arab street [xxxix].

Turkish-Israeli relations have witnessed a critical turning point, with tensions and estrangement escalating after years of close security and military cooperation. Turkey has canceled joint military exercises, reduced security coordination, and intensified its political rhetoric condemning the occupation's policies. That Türkiye's shift from a cautious mediator role to an explicit stance supporting just causes, foremost among them the Palestinian cause [(xl)].

The Turkish government has exploited the political escalation to strengthen its regional position and has sought to align with the popular Islamic mood, which rejects Western hegemony and supports the Palestinian cause. That the positions were widely supported by Arab Islamic movements, which contributed to the rise in Erdogan's popularity among the Arab peoples. So his speeches were broadcast on Arab satellite channels, and his image was used in popular demonstrations as a symbol of a Muslim leader challenging Western hegemony [(xli).]

He returned that Transformation draws Türkiye's image as cooperating an independent regional state with a moral and strategic vision, balancing its national interests with its commitment to humanitarian values. Some analysts have pointed out that that the position was not directed only at Israel, but was a message to the United States and the European Union that Türkiye would not be subservient to their policies towards the region, but rather an independent actor with a different project [(xlii)].

It can be saidforTurkey's position on the Israeli aggression on Gaza in 2008 and Erdogan's statements in Davos 2009 were not merely a passing political stance, but were part of a broader strategic shift in Turkish foreign policy. So ankara has sought to strengthen its position as apracticeAn independent regional state, with an emphasis on relations with Arab and Islamic peoples, which led to a radical change in the course of its foreign policy towards the Middle East.

**The Second Topic**

**The regional and international dimension of Turkish policy towards Palestine for the duration(2002-2011).**

**A-The crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations after 2006.**

Turkish-Israeli relations have gradually deteriorated since genera 2006 as a result of a series of events and shifts in political positions, So under the rule of the Justice and Development Party, Türkiye began to adopt a more independent policy toward regional issues. The Palestinian issue was a top priority for Turkish foreign policy [(xliii)].

Turkish-Israeli relations reached their peak in May of the year 2010, when Israel attacked the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, part of the Freedom Flotilla, which was en route to Gaza carrying humanitarian aid. The attack resulted in the deaths of nine Turkish activists, sparking widespread outrage in Turkey and the Arab and Islamic world. Turkey had called for the blockade on Gaza to be lifted and refused to submit to the double standards with which the international community dealt with the Palestinian issue. Following the attack, the Turkish government demanded an official apology from Israel. In addition to Compensation for the families of the victims, and lifting the siege on Gaza [(xliv)].

A the attack on the Mavi Marmara ship led to a severe diplomatic crisis between Türkiye and Israel. So ankara suspended military cooperation with Israel and recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Turkey also refused to normalize relations with Israel unless the latter met its demands. This, in turn, strengthened Türkiye's position in the Arab and Islamic world. So many viewed her as a major supporter of the Palestinian cause in the context of her rejection of Israeli policies [(xlv)].

After 2010 the attack on Mavi Marmara had a significant impact on Turkey's regional

policy shifts. So Türkiye has adopted a policy more aligned with Palestinian interests, which has contributed to strengthening its presence in the Arab world. On the other hand, that the crisis has led to a gradual decline in military and intelligence cooperation between Türkiye and Israel, while Türkiye has maintained relations with prominent Palestinian movements such as Hamas, which has given it an increasing status as a key supporter of the Palestinian cause [xlvi].

After the attack, the issue of apology and compensation was raised in negotiations with Israel, so Turkey rejected any attempts at normalization unless these demands were met. Despite international pressure, Ankara maintained its political position, considering the defense of Palestinian rights a matter of principle that constitutes part of its political identity. The strained relations continued until 2013. So Israel partially responded to Turkish demands and formally apologized, which helped ease the crisis between the two countries, although tensions over the Palestinian issue remain [xlvii].

**B-Turkish-American relations and positions this is from the Palestinian issue.**

Turkish leaders have been vocal in their criticism of US policies complicit with Israel following the 2008–2009 Gaza War, arguing that American double standards undermine confidence in the international order. In several official speeches, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has criticized US bias. American to Israel, and its refusal to condemn the attacks that have killed hundreds of Palestinian civilians, considering the American silence to be "tacit approval" of the aggression. Ankara also used its diplomatic means to express its displeasure, by repeating calls for reform of the United Nations system and criticizing the American veto that prevents the issuance of clear condemnation resolutions against Israel in the Security Council [xlviii].

Ankara chose to maintain its strategic lines of communication with Washington, Especially On issues such as energy security, political transitions in Iraq, and coordination within NATO, it has not hesitated to publicly contradict American positions when they conflict with Turkish interests or values. This was evident in Ankara's refusal to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, contrary to the American designation, and its insistence on recognizing it as an elected political force that expresses the will of the people. This has strengthened that the position portrayed Türkiye as a potential mediator between Palestinian factions and the international community, which sometimes placed it in a position of tension with traditional Western policies in the Middle East [xlix].

It can be said that incident boat the Mavi Marmara operation contributed to Turkey's emergence as an independent regional player in the Middle East, reflecting popular sentiments against traditional Western policies and demonstrating a strategic shift in Turkish policy toward greater independence. Despite tensions with Israel and the United States, American However, Türkiye has succeeded in maintaining its position as a supporter of humanitarian issues in the region, foremost among which is the Palestinian cause.

**The Third Topic**

**Turkish initiatives to support the Palestinian cause for the duration (2002-2011)**

**A: Humanitarian and relief support for the Gaza Strip.**

Türkiye activated its humanitarian presence in the Gaza Strip in early 2010, capitalizing on the deteriorating humanitarian conditions resulting from the ongoing blockade since 2007. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) then intensified its activities in December 2010, launching projects in the fields of education, health, and infrastructure. These projects included the restoration of schools damaged by the Israeli aggression and the provision of medical equipment to a number of hospitals. This coincided with the escalation of Turkish interaction with the Palestinian issue. Especially

Following the Freedom Flotilla incident in May 2010, which deepened tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv, Ankara's push to support Gaza politically and humanitarian ally increased. Following the outbreak of the so-called "Arab Spring" in early 2011, Turkey took advantage of the growing regional vacuum to strengthen its position in the Palestinian arena. It continued its support for civilian projects in the Gaza Strip, focusing on the continuity of the aid it had begun the previous year [(l)].

The Turkish government strengthened its position in Palestinian sentiment during 2010 and 2011 by continuing to publicly condemn the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, imposed since 2007, and by providing political support to Hamas, which maintained close relations with Ankara despite Western pressure. In a speech delivered to the Turkish Parliament on June 1, 2010, then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed his strong rejection of the Israeli attack on the Freedom Flotilla, stressing that "Gaza will not be left alone," adding that "the Palestinian issue is not the issue of one people, but rather the issue of all of humanity." Erdogan then reiterated his same positions in his speech before the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 2011, where he stated that "Palestine is the bleeding wound in the conscience of humanity, and Turkey will not remain silent about the injustice in Gaza" [(li)].

Turkey has also invested in the symbolic power of Jerusalem, sponsoring projects to support the city's residents, including the restoration of homes in the Old City, supporting educational institutions, and sponsoring cultural and religious activities. This has given a new dimension to its presence in Palestine, extending beyond the Gaza Strip to Jerusalem. This engagement has sparked growing Israeli concern, which has translated into restrictions on Ankara- backed associations in East Jerusalem ([lii]).

Since the Freedom Flotilla incident on 31 May 2010, Turkey has continued to exert political and diplomatic pressure in international forums, demanding the lifting of the blockade on the Gaza Strip and holding Israel accountable for its violations against Palestinian civilians. On 2 June 2010, Ankara filed a formal complaint with the UN Security Council, calling for an international investigation into the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara, a ship carrying humanitarian aid. Turkey also increased its diplomatic efforts in the second half of 2010, and on 17 July 2011, Turkey sent a shipment of medical and humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip through the Turkish Red Crescent in coordination with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), as part of its continued and increasing humanitarian support [(liii)].

It became clear to usTurkey's policy toward Gaza was not merely a passing humanitarian initiative, but rather a deliberate strategic move within the Justice and Development Party's vision to reshape Turkey's regional role. Ankara invested in soft power tools—aid, relief, and moral discourse—to fill a void left by traditional Arab powers, thereby redefining its position as an active player in the issues of the Islamic world, most notably the Palestinian cause.

**For-Türkiye's role in supporting Palestinian reconciliation Between Fatah and Hamas(2002-2011).**

Between 2002 and 2011, Turkey sought to present itself as an effective mediator in Palestinian reconciliation efforts between Fatah and Hamas, as part of its efforts to strengthen its influence in the Middle East. In 2009 Ankara hosted the first round of dialogue between Palestinian factions in Istanbul, seeking to unify Palestinian ranks after years of deep division that emerged after Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Ankara has repeatedly emphasized that Palestinian unity is the key to achieving a just settlement with Israel, and that the international community can only negotiate with the Palestinians if they are united [(liv)].

Since 2006, Türkiye has adopted a supportive stance toward the Palestinian reconciliation

process, especially after Hamas won the legislative elections. So Ankara believes that the absence of Palestinian national unity hinders any efforts towards a comprehensive settlement. Therefore the Turkish leadership, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic apparatus, sought to heal the rift between the Fatah and Hamas movements. It hosted unannounced dialogue rounds in Istanbul and Ankara, focusing on the need to formulate a unified Palestinian vision on core issues [lv].

Led that the positions have led to a clear tension in Turkish-American relations since 2006, as the United States refused American- which classifies Hamas as a terrorist organization - has rejected any diplomatic contact or openness with the movement, placing Ankara at odds with the US position. So Türkiye adhered to its position, stressing that Palestinian reconciliation should be based on the free Palestinian national will, without any foreign interference. Meanwhile, Turkish politics worked to consolidate the independence of its diplomatic decision-making, adopting a "multi-directional foreign policy" approach, which has enabled it to expand its margin of external maneuver without being completely dependent on American and Western positions, in line with its vision for a more effective and balanced regional role in the Middle East [lvi].

During 2011, Türkiye intensified its efforts to support the Palestinian reconciliation agreement signed in Cairo on 4 May 2011, between the Fatah and Hamas movements, considering Palestinian unity a prerequisite for achieving any just political settlement. On 5 May 2011, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu welcomed the agreement, praising what he described as a "historic step towards Palestinian national unity", and calling on the international community to respect that the Palestinian option and non-interference in it. And contributed that the position is to consolidate Türkiye's image as a party that supports the independence of Palestinian decision-making, and as an opponent of any external tutelage over the internal dialogue between the factions [lvii].

He appearsfor usfeaturesthetransformationatAnoStrategicAndIn Turkish policy towards the Palestinian issue, from the position of a traditional ally of the West to an independent regional actor that deals with the issue from moral and ideological perspectives.

**C. Turkey's vote in favor of recognizing Palestine at the United Nations in 2011.**

Türkiye voted on 29 November 2011 in favor of granting Palestine non-member state status at the United Nations, a decision that reflects Türkiye's continued commitment to supporting Palestinian rights in international forums. That the position is consistent with the approach adopted by the Justice and Development Party in Türkiye since it came to power in 2002 [lviii].

Turkish officials confirmed that that Voting is an expression of their support for international legitimacy and the right to self-determination. In addition to their continued rejection of Western policies biased toward Israel. Ankara saw that that the vote represents a historic correction of the injustice that has been inflicted on the Palestinian people for decades [lix].

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said that that the vote not only reflects support for Palestine, but also a firm stance against the Israeli occupation, stressing that the vote came within the framework of Türkiye's support for international legitimacy [lx].

Led that The vote strengthens Türkiye's position as a major supporter of Palestinian rights on the international stage, reflecting its ongoing efforts to assert its position as an effective regional power in Middle East affairs [lxi].

Despite international pressure, Türkiye has maintained its firm stance, affirming its commitment to the rights of the Palestinian people regardless of Western pressure, which has strengthened its position in the region [lxii].

The Turkish vote was accompanied by a broad diplomatic campaign that included mobilizing support from regional and international countries for the recognition of Palestine, which strengthened Türkiye's position on the international stage and confirmed its readiness to challenge traditional Western hegemony [lxiii].

Overall, Turkish policy towards the Palestinian issue represents a strategic shift towards independence in foreign policy. This Reflects for us A significant investment in "soft power" through diplomacy and humanitarianism has enabled Türkiye to strengthen its position as a major supporter of the Palestinian cause and an influencer in the regional arena.

**Conclusions**

1. Türkiye worked During the years (2006_2011) To enhance its supportive role for Palestine in international forums, so she voted in favor of granting Palestine non-member state status at the United Nations in 2011, reflecting her steadfast commitment to the cause of the Palestinian people.

2. Türkiye has intensified its humanitarian and relief efforts in the Gaza Strip through TIKA and Turkish NGOs, helping build a strong image of Turkey as a key supporter of the Palestinian cause in the Arab and Islamic worlds..

3. The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident caused a major rift in relations between Türkiye and Israel. Ankara condemned the Israeli attack on the Turkish ship and suspended military cooperation, expressing its rejection of Israeli policies against the Palestinians..

4. Türkiye has adhered to its independent position in supporting Palestinian reconciliation and has rejected foreign interference, which has led it to adopt a foreign policy based on strengthening its sovereignty and refusing to submit to pressure from major powers. EspeciallyIn issues such as Hamas.

Türkiye has sought to reinforce its position as an influential regional power through its continued support for Palestine, which has strengthened its relations with Arab and Islamic countries while simultaneously enhancing its role as a key mediator in Middle Eastern affairs.

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([i]) Louise Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 212.

([ii]) William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, Routledge, 2000, PP. 265-268.

([iii]) Ibid, PP 265-268.

([iv])Meliha Benli Altun Işık, The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2000, pp. 172–191.

([v])NATO:NATO was founded or swear NATO was established in 1949 under the Washington Treaty. It was established as a military alliance comprising Western European countries and the United States of America, with the aim of confronting the growing Soviet threat during the Cold War. Accordingly Article 5 of the Treaty stipulated the principle of collective defense. So an attack on any member of the Alliance is an attack on all members. That's why I sought **Türkiye** Join It joined the alliance in 1952, after adopting a foreign policy hostile to the Soviet Union and contributing to the Korean War as part of the UN forces, which strengthened its standing in the eyes of Western countries. Its accession was intended to strengthen the alliance's southeastern front, countering growing Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. For more see:

The Encyclopedia of Military History, Harper and Row, New York, 1986, p. 1206.

([vi]) Didem Gürkan, The Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From the Cold War to the AKP Era, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, PP. 212-228.

([vii]Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War, Hurst and Company, 2003, PP. 98–104.

([viii])Tel Aviv: The city is located on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, near the Palestinian city of Jaffa, and is considered the first modern Jewish urban project, Founded when what In the spring of 1909, sixty Jewish families gathered to divide a sandy plot of land north of Jaffa, in an area then known as "Karm Gebaly." The land, purchased from Palestinian Arab families, stretched between the barren coastal dunes and the agricultural plains of the Sharon to the east. The city was named Tel Aviv, a compound name with symbolic significance: "Tel" refers to the historical accumulation of ancient cities in the land of Canaan, while "Aviv" – meaning "spring" in Hebrew – symbolizes renewal and rebirth. The name was inspired by the Hebrew translation of Theodore Hart's book "The Old New Land. ZL , founder of political Zionism, so the founders wanted to combine the alleged authenticity with the desired modernity. The project was led by Meir Dizenkoff, who later became the city's first mayor. The Ahuzat Bayit association organized the establishment process according to a strict Western architectural plan, reflecting the desire to break with the eastern character of the neighboring city of Jaffa and build an independent Jewish urban entity that would represent the new settler identity. For more see:

Walid Khalidi, Before the Roots Are Uprooted, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 2000, P.S114–118.

([ix]) Pinar Bilgin, Turkey's Shifting Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, International Politics, Vol. 45, 2008, PP. 333–353.

([x]) Kemal Kirişci, Turkey and the Palestinian Question: Domestic Concerns and Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2001, PP. 111–136.

([xi]) Philip Robins, Op. Cite, PP. 98-104.

([xii]) Mustafa and Ifantis Aydın, Kostas (eds.), Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean, Routledge, 2004, PP. 135–140.

([xiii])The Second Palestinian Intifada: Or as it was known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, it was one of the uprisings that erupted against the Israeli occupation, expressing the overwhelming popular rejection of injustice and continuous provocation. It erupted that the uprising in 28 September 2000, after Ariel Sharon, then the leader of the Israeli opposition, stormed the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in occupied East Jerusalem, a move that was considered an insult to Muslim sentiments and a blatant challenge to Palestinian rights in the holy city. And it came that the uprising followed the failure of the peace negotiations at the second Camp David summit, held in July. general 2000, between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, under US auspices. The Palestinian side rejected Israeli dictates aimed at liquidating the essence of the Palestinian cause, particularly those related to Jerusalem and refugees. The uprising transformed from mass protests into an open confrontation, with resistance taking various forms, including armed operations targeting occupation sites and settlements. Meanwhile, Israel confronted the uprising with excessive force, using aircraft and tanks, and committing massacres and assassinations. For more see:

Walid Khalidi, The Question of Palestine before International Law, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 2002, p. 143.

([xiv]) Hinnebusch, Raymond and Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, The Foreign Policies of the Middle East States, Lynne Rienner, 2014, p. 178.

([xv])Justice and Development Party: The Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded on August 14, 2001, by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and a group of his colleagues who had defected from the political Islamist movement following the banning of the Virtue Party. Since its inception, the party has been characterized by a moderate discourse, declaring its commitment to democracy and secularism, which has enabled it to attract a broad popular base. In the 2002 elections, the party won a landslide victory, enabling it to form a government alone. It then embarked on a series of economic and political reforms, while simultaneously seeking to strengthen Türkiye's relations with the European Union.For more see:

The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, pp. 70–73.

([xvi]) Burhanettin Duran, Understanding the AK Party's Identity Politics: An Islamism Recast, Vol. 13, No. 1, Insight Turkey, 2011, pp. 65-82.

([xvii]) Hinnebusch, Op. Cite, p. 178.

([xviii]) Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Born in the Kasim Pasa district of Istanbul on February 26, 1954 He received his primary education at Kamal Atabi Primary School.1960 Then he continued his secondary studies at the Imams and Preachers School in Istanbul and graduation In 1973, he joined the Faculty of Economics and Commercial Sciences at Marmara University. So He completed his university studies in 1981. He began his political career in the early 1970s, joining the National Salvation Party. After the party was dissolved following the 1980 military coup, Erdoğan joined the Welfare Party, which inherited the same Islamist orientation. He was elected deputy chairman of the party's Istanbul branch. In 1994, he ran in the municipal elections and won the post of Mayor of Greater Istanbul. In 1998 He was arrested after delivering a religious speech deemed inflammatory and spent several months in prison, leading to his removal from office. He then founded the Justice and Development Party in 2001. He officially assumed the prime minister ship in Marchgeneral2003, and continued inthatHe held the position until 2014, when he was elected President of the Republic of Turkey. Erdogan is known for his populist rhetoric, his harsh stance toward Israel, and his public support for the Palestinian cause, which has earned him widespread popularity among Islamist circles. For more see:

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 18, Inc., Chicago, 2023, pp. 573–575.

([xix]) On 27 December2008, Israel launched a large-scale military operation against the Gaza Strip, known as "Operation Cast Lead," which resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries, most of them civilians. that the operation was ostensibly in response to rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, but it was widely condemned due to the massive destruction and indiscriminate targeting . For more see:

Richard Goldstone, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, United Nations, Geneva, 2009, PP. 6–15.

([xx]) Hasan Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, SS. 140–144; Duran, Burhanettin, Op. Cite, P.P. 65–82.

([xxi]) Davos Forum:It was held in the Swiss resort of Davos between January 28_February 12009Under the theme of addressing the repercussions of the global financial crisis, the forum was attended by a number of senior leaders, including Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki- moon, Prime Minister of Israel Shimon Peres, and Prime Minister of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdogan. I touched on the sessions address economic and political issues, most notably the Israeli aggression on Gaza.More to see:

Klaus Schwab, The Global Agenda 2009: World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, World Economic Forum, Geneva, 2009, PP. 15–22.

([xxii]) Shimon Peres: Born in the city of Vishneva Located then in Poland (and today part of Belarus) On August 2, 1923 He joined the traditional Jewish elementary school in 1929, and continued his studies there until 1933.In 1934 he moved with his family moved to Palestine. In the same year, he enrolled in the Ben Shemen Agricultural School near tel Aviv, where he remained until his graduation in 1940. He continued his higher education at the David Yellin Teachers' College in Jerusalem.so he studied between 1941 and 1943. He later traveled to the United States to pursue his studies at the New School in New York, and then enrolled in an executive program at Harvard University's Graduate School of Management. He began his political and military career at an early age, joining the Haganah and contributing to the development of military industries during the 1948 war. He was appointed Director General of the Ministry of Defense in 1953, Practice it a pivotal role in strengthening military cooperation with France. As he held several ministerial positions, including the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs, and he also served as Prime Minister twice (1984–1986).),((1995–1996). He also served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Regional Development in subsequent governments. He was elected President of the State of Israel in 2007, serving until 2014. Died on September 28, 2016.For more see:

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 26, Inc., Chicago, 2023, pp. 415–418.

([xxiii]) Hinnebusch, Op. Cit. P. 178.

([xxiv]) Burhanettin Duran, Op. Cite, P.P. 65–82.

([xxv]) Bülent Aras, Turkey and the Palestinian Question: From Consistent Pro-Israeli Policy to Active Engagement, Perceptions Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2011, SS. 25–38.

([xxvi]) M. Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement, Oxford University Press, 2013, PP. 198–202.

([xxvii]) Binnur Ozkececi-Taner, From Kemalism to Soft Power: The International Context of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2005, pp. 77–96.

([xxviii]) Abdullah Gul: He was born in Kayseri, a city in the Central Anatolia region of the Republic of Türkiye, on the 29th. October of the year1950. He grew up in a conservative environment, and began his primary education at Al-Jumhuriya Primary School in 1957, and in 1genera 1962 He moved to Kayseri Preparatory High School, and then joined the Industrial High School in the same city. 1 genera1965, and completed his secondary education there in 1967. Gul continued his higher education at Istanbul University, so He joined the Faculty of Economics in 1967 and graduated in 1971. Abdullah Gül began his political career by joining the Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan, and was elected as a member of the Turkish Parliament for the city of Kayseri for the first time on 20 October1991. After the Welfare Party was banned, he joined the Virtue Party, and then was one of the founding members of the Justice and Development Party on 14 dad 2001. He assumed the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 14 March 2003, and remained in that Position until 28 AB 2007On the same day, the 28th, dad2007, he was elected President of the Republic of Turkey, becoming the first president with an Islamic background to be democratically elected in the history of the Republic. His term lasted until 28 dad 2014. For more see:

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, 2014, p. 215.

([xxix])Khaled Meshaal: He was born in the village of Silwad, near the city of Ramallah in the West Bank, on 28 May 1956. He then moved with his family to Kuwait during his early childhood due to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967. Mashal attended the Arab Institute School in Kuwait, where he received his primary and secondary education. In 1974, he transferred to Al-Sabah Secondary School. So he completed his secondary education in the science section. He then continued his higher education by enrolling at Kuwait University in 1975, where he majored in physics and graduated with a bachelor's degree in 1978. During his university studies, Mashal became involved in political work and Islamic activism, so he and a number of his colleagues founded the Palestinian Students Association, which had an Islamic orientation and was the nucleus of the activities of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood abroad. He co-founded the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) abroad in December 1987, following the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada, and became one of its most prominent political leaders. In 1996, Meshaal assumed the presidency of Hamas's political bureau. and On September 25, 1997, Meshaal survived an assassination attempt orchestrated by the Israeli Mossad in the Jordanian capital, Amman, an event that earned him widespread international notoriety. Meshaal continued to lead Hamas's Political Bureau until May 4, 2017, when he handed over leadership of the Political Bureau to Ismail Haniyeh. For more see:

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Khaled Meshaal, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, 2023, p. 417.

([xxx])Kemal Inat, Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası 2006, Sakarya Üniversitesi Yayınları, Sakarya Üniversitesi Yayın Evi, Sakarya, 2006, SS. 35–36.

([xxxi]) Andrew F. Cooper, The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, PP. 112- 114.

([xxxii]Gallia Lindenstrauss, Turkey and Hamas: Between Strategic Interests and Ideological Affinity Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Strategic Assessment, Vol. 17, No. 2, July 2014, pp. 71–83.

([xxxiii]) Kemal İnat, Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası 2006, Sakarya University Yayınları, Sakarya, 2006, SS 35-36.

([xxxiv]The Celebrant Yilmaz, Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An Assessment of Turkish Engagement with Hama (2006- 2011) In: Tziarras, Zenonas (ed.), Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, pp. 113–131.

([xxxv]) Taspinar, Ömer Turkey's Middle East Policies: Between Neo- Ottomanism and Kemal ism, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, pp. 15-17.

([xxxvi]) Ahmed Davutoglu: Born in Konya, Central Anatolia on 26 February 1959. He received his primary education at the Meram School in Konya, then movedgeneral1974 to Istanbul so he continued his studies at the "Imams and Preachers High School" and completed it. general 1977. He then joined Boğaziçi University in Istanbul, where he studied economics and

political science, and graduated. General 1983. He continued his postgraduate studies at the same university, obtaining a master's degree. General 1985, then Ph Dgeneral1990, specializing in comparative political thought. He began his academic career general 1990, he began teaching International Relations at Marmara University, and later became Dean of the Faculty of Economics at Beykent University in Istanbul, and continued in that Position untilgeneral2002. Income Tour Politician on November 18 general 2002 when he was appointed advisor to Prime Minister Abdullah Gul And Then he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1May 2009, and continued his duties until August 28, 2014.so on the same day, he assumed the position of Prime Minister and the chairmanship of the Justice and Development Party. He resigned from both positions on 22 May 2016, as a result of internal disagreements with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.13In December 2019, he founded the Future Party in opposition to the existing authorities. for more see:

Oxford Reference, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, p. 198.

([xxxvii]) Robins, Philip Turkey and the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, PP. 123-126.

([xxxviii]) Ahmed Davutoğlu, Strategic Depth: Türkiye's Position in the International Arena, Sutour Publishing House, Istanbul, 2010, p. 217.

([xxxix]) F. Stephen Larrabee, "Turkey's New Geopolitics," RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2010, p. 36.

([xl]) William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774, Routledge, London, 2013, p. 202.

([xli]) Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, p. 192.

([xlii]) Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, Hurst and Company, London, 2003, p. 265.

([xliii]) Ayman Abdelaziz, Turkey-Israel Relations: From Strategic Alliance to Strategic Divorce, Middle Eastern Studies Journal, 2011, PP. 45-50.

([xliv]) Ahmet Davutoğlu, Strategy Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu, 2001, PP. 250-260.

([xlv]) Ibid, pp. 250-260.

([xlvi]) Lale Sariibrahimoglu, The Changing Face of Turkish Foreign Policy, The Turkish Foreign Policy Review, 2014, PP. 70-75.

([xlvii]) Jonathan Schanzer, The New Turkish Foreign Policy, The Middle East Forum, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2015, pp. 85-90.

([xlviii])Dağı, İhsan, Turkey Between Democracy and Militarism: Post-Kemalist Perspectives, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 2010, PP. 114–117.

([xlix]) Barkey, Henri J., and Fuller, Graham E. Turkey's Kurdish Question, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland, 1998, PP. 203–206.

([l]TIKA Annual Report 2012, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), Ankara, 2013, p. 58.

([li])Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, October 2013, Official Bulletin of the TBMM, No. 2147, 2020, p. 3.

([lii]) Gallia Lindenstrauss, Turkey and the Palestinians: A Delicate Balancing Act, INSS Insight No. 1176, Tel Aviv University, 2019, p. 2.

([liii]) Kemal Kirişci, Turkey and the Palestinians: New Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2014, p. 11.

([liv]) Özdemir, A., Turkey's Role in Middle Eastern Diplomacy: A Shift, Istanbul Strategic University Press, Istanbul, 2010, p. 120.

([lv]) Fuat Keyman, Op. Cite, P.P. 2284-2287.

([lvi]) Gallia Lindenstrauss, The Turkey-Israel rapprochement of 2016: what does it mean for bilateral cooperation, Strategic Assessment, INSS, Vol. 19, No. 2, July 2016, pp. 27–34.

([lvii]) Bülent Aras, Turkey's State Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, SS. 89-91.

([lviii]) Akır, Mustafa. Türk Dış Politikası ve Orta Doğu: Dönüşüm ve Strategieler (Çev. Türkçe). İstanbul University Yayınları, İstanbul, 2013, S. 125.

([lix]) Kaya, Alper, Çağdaş Türk Dış Politikası: Ortadoğu'daki Yeri (Çev. Türkçe). Ankara University Yayınları, Ankara, 2014, S. 147.

([lx]) Muhammed Şin, Contemporary Turkish Politics and Foreign Policy (Translated from English). Academy Press, Cairo, 2016, p. 98.

([lxi]) Fahd. Kudra, Turkey's Role in Regional and Global Foreign Policy: An Analytical Study (Translated from Arabic). Dar al-Shorouk Publishing, Amman, 2015, p. 210.

([lxii]) Yusuf. Ali, Turkish Foreign Policy and the Middle East: Shifting Relations (Translated from Arabic). Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, Beirut, 2017, p. 181.

([lxiii]) Hassan. Al-Zahrani, Turkish Diplomatic Movements in Regional Issues (Translated from Arabic). King Saud University Press, Riyadh, 2019, p. 215.